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Abstract—Smart grid users and standardization committees
require that utilities and third parties collecting metering data
employ techniques for limiting the level of precision of the
gathered household measurements to a granularity no finer
than what is required for providing the expected service. Data
aggregation and data perturbation are two such techniques.
This paper provides quantitative means to identify a tradeoff
between the aggregation set size, the precision on the aggregated
measurements, and the privacy level. This is achieved by formally
defining an attack to the privacy of an individual user and
calculating how much its success probability is reduced by
applying data perturbation. Under the assumption of time-
correlation of the measurements, colored noise can be used to
reduce even further the success probability. The tightness of the
analytical results is evaluated by comparing them to experimental
data.
I. INTRODUCTION
According to the novel Smart Grid paradigm, Smart Meters
are connected to the communication network of the electricity
grid through the Automatic Metering Infrastructure (AMI)
and send their measurements about energy consumption to
the power suppliers or other External Entities (EEs) such as
grid managers or third party service providers. There is ample
literature showing that electricity usage readings leak users’
sensitive information: it has been shown [1], [2] that external
subjects accessing these data might infer private informations
about the users by exploiting the customers’ behaviour and
even to determine which household appliances are being used
during a given time span. This could potentially lead to
threatening consequences: for example, burglars could detect
whether houses are unoccupied before attempting burglaries,
vendors could select potential targets for their marketing
campaigns, insurances could infer the health status or the
likelihood for an individual to cause accidents at home.
Therefore, both users and standardization bodies [3], [4]
require that a secure and privacy-friendly collection framework
is implemented to ensure privacy and confidentiality of data
collected from the Smart Meters.
There is a significant body of work discussing how indivi-
dual data can be aggregated in a cryptographically secure way
so that entities providing ancillary services can only access to
a function, generally the sum, of the measurements gathered
from several meters (see, for example, [5], [6], [7], [8]). None
of these works, however, answers a fundamental question: how
large the aggregation set must be in order to ensure privacy?
Clearly, if the aggregation set is too small, though an observer
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will not have access to the exact measurement from each
meter, he will be able to make reasonable guesses about the
usage of specific appliances. These guesses can grow more
and more precise as the observation interval becomes longer.
Further, in order to give an estimate of the minimal aggregation
set size for guaranteeing privacy, one must make assumptions
on the behavior of the other users, which are hard to make
and justify.
The second most popular approach for providing privacy
to metering data is to modify the meter readings in order to
conceal the fingerprints of appliances, thus making deanoni-
mization or non-intrusive load monitoring less effective. This
concealment is achieved either by using batteries or by directly
adding random noise to the measurements (see, for example,
[9], [10], [11]). This approach has the drawback of distorting
the metering results, which will thus become less useful also
for the legitimate recipient. It is worth noting, however, that
the two above mentioned approaches can be combined. On
one hand, the addition of random noise to an aggregate mea-
surement makes the privacy of each individual independent of
the behavior of other house dwellers. On the other hand, the
aggregation of multiple meters makes it possible to reduce the
impact of the added noise, resulting in more precise aggregate
measurements.
Dimensioning the noise to be added to the aggregate is
a crucial issue to make privacy-friendly approaches feasible
for deployment in a large-scale grid. Some researchers have
tackled this problem by using differential privacy [12], utility
function [13], or information-theoretic metrics [11]. We intro-
duce a definition of privacy that makes it easy to calculate
the amount of noise necessary to ensure privacy and explicitly
consider the beneficial impact of aggregation.
The contributions of this paper are the following:
• The formalization of the notion of ε-Privacy as a measure
of the privacy of the users generating the measurements;
• The analytical derivation of the ε parameter for privacy
guarantees, under the assumption that additive Gaussian
noise is used for data perturbation;
• The evaluation of how privacy can be improved by
employing suitably colored noise.
The derived results are optimal in the sense that no attack to
privacy can further increase the value of ε without additional
knowledge. These result are extremely useful in the design
of Smart Metering deployments, which are expected to run
for several years. Therefore possibile privacy risks must be
anticipated and tackled with, even without precise knowledge
of the attackers’ strategies. We prove the effectiveness of our
proposal by evaluating its performance with real Smart Meters
measurements from the Smart* dataset [14].
2The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section
II provides an overview of the related work. Our proposed
data aggregation architecture is discussed in Section III. The
formalization of a Privacy Challenge and of the resulting
attack scenario are discussed in Section IV. Section V reports
a theoretical analysis of the probability of success of such
attack for two different characterizations of the injected noise,
whereas Section VI shows numerical results obtained using
real measurement traces. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Our attack scenario builds upon the notion of differential
privacy, which was first introduced by Dwork et al. in [15]
and aims at guaranteeing that the removal or addition of a
single item in a statistical database has negligible impact on
the outcome of any query on that database. The authors give
a formal definition of differential privacy as a measure of
the tradeoff between the precision of the aggregate data and
the probability of identifying the contributions of individual
data inside the aggregate. Moreover, the authors describe how
to achieve a target level of differential privacy by means of
noise injection in the users’ data. Our attack scenario for time
series is based on the same principle. However, our approach
is more focused on the specific characteristics of Smart Grid
time series, resulting in simpler definitions.
The same authors of [15] present in [16] some applications
of differential privacy to statistical data inference and learning
theory, while in [17] they extend the study to the statistical
characterization of the noise to be injected in general query
functions, proving that privacy can be preserved by calibrating
the standard deviation of the noise according to the function
sensitivity.
Some other papers combine cryptographic schemes with
differential privacy techniques in order to compute aggregate
statistics: in [18], Dwork et al. propose a protocol for the dis-
tributed generation of random noise, aimed at the distributed
implementation of privacy-preserving statistical databases by
means of a verifiable secret sharing scheme.
Danezis et al. [19] apply differential privacy to a billing
protocol to evaluate the monetary amount that customers
should add to their bill in order to provably hide their activities,
and proposes a cryptographic protocol for oblivious billing
which imposes no additional expenditure.
Rastogi et al. [20] design a protocol for differentially private
aggregation of temporally correlated time series, which is
achieved by perturbation of the Discrete Fourier Transform
of the data and by distributed noise addition. The protocol
scales efficiently with the number of users, since it requires
a computational load per user of O(1). Our solution also
relies on noise addition, which is performed directly on the
individual metering data.
Some works [21], [12], [13], [22], [23], [24] apply the
general notions expressed in [15] to the Smart Grid context.
Jelasity et al. [23] extend the application of differential pri-
vacy to streams of time-consecutive queries and analytically
characterize the power to be injected in order to guarantee
the privacy of individual measurements, when observed for
an unlimited amount of time. In our paper, we also evaluate
the impact of the time observation intervals on the achieved
privacy level. Acs et al. [12] define a scheme in which
an electricity supplier is allowed to collect aggregate smart-
metering measurements without learning anything about the
energy consumption and the household activities of individual
users, and discuss how differential privacy is affected by
considering multiple time slots. However, this paper does
not deal with temporal correlation of metering time series.
Conversely, our proposal considers this feature, which can be
exploited to reduce the level of privacy of the users’ data.
Chan et al. [22] deal with a scenario in which an untrusted
aggregator collects user data to periodically compute aggregate
statistics. The proposed solution is resilient to users’ failures
and compromises and supports dynamic joins and leaves. We
also assume untrusted aggregation nodes, but we focus our
attention on a static scenario.
Shi et al. [21] define a model of data aggregator capable of
obtaining statistics about aggregate data without compromising
the privacy of single users. The authors introduce a formal
noise injection model and a new distributed data randomization
algorithm in order to ensure users’ differential privacy, assum-
ing the existence of malicious users that reveal their statistics
to the data aggregator. Moreover, the authors define an error
bound for aggregated data and evaluate the tradeoff between
data utility and privacy. The same tradeoff evaluation is
discussed by Rajagopalan et al. [13], who propose to filter low-
power frequency components of smart-metering time series, in
order to perform data obfuscation without compromising its
statistical significance.
Zhao et al. [24] combine differential privacy with a battery-
based load scheduling algorithm. However, such approach can
be applied only in case the households are equipped with
storage devices, which could lead to considerable installation
and maintenance costs. Our proposed framework does not
require any storage equipment.
In [25], Zhang et al. propose a new noise model to achieve
data perturbation. The noise is correlated to time series in
order to increase users’ privacy without compromising data
utility by means of a noise generation algorithm called PESP
(Privacy Enhanced State-dependent Perturbation).
Although our work builds upon the notion of differential
privacy, it differs from the previously mentioned approaches
because it introduces a new definition of noise injection.
In particular, Acs et al. [12] consider a Laplace distributed
noise, whereas Shi et al. [21] consider a noise with geometric
symmetric distribution. Such models are chosen to fit the dif-
ferential privacy analytical results obtained in [15]. Conversely,
we consider Gaussian noise, which allows for a comprehensive
theoretical analysis in support to numerical results.
All the noise processes considered by the previous literature
in the context of differential privacy are white noise processes,
i.e., they refer to statistically uncorrelated sequences. In our
work, referring to the approach proposed in [23], [25], we
extend data perturbation to colored (i.e., correlated) noise se-
quences and study the assumptions under which colored noise
leads to better performance in terms of privacy preservation
with respect to white noise.
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Fig. 1. The data perturbation and aggregation procedure
III. THE AGGREGATION ARCHITECTURE
We consider an AMI network with N Meters, each one
conveying its measurements to an Aggregator, which is re-
sponsible for the data aggregation and for communicating the
final aggregate to an EE. At each round t, the Meters generate
the measurements si[t], where i is the Meter number, add
a perturbation noise li[t] and deliver them to an Aggregator.
The Aggregator sums the individual perturbed measurements
xi[t] = si[t] + li[t] and delivers to the interested EE the
quantity:
X[t] =
N∑
i=1
xi[t] =
N∑
i=1
si[t] +
N∑
i=1
li[t] = S[t] + L[t]
where S[t] =
∑N
i=1 si[t] and L[t] =
∑N
i=1 li[t]. Note that
in the remainder of the paper, referring to temporal measure-
ments, we will use upper case letters to indicate aggregate
values and lower case letters to refer to individual values.
A pictorial view of our considered scenario is proposed in
Figure 1.
The noise li[t] is a Gaussian colored noise with zero-mean
and variance σ2l obtained by filtering a white Gaussian noise
l′i[t] with a Linear Time Invariant (LTI) filter K. The output
of the aggregation procedure leads to an aggregate zero-mean
Gaussian colored noise L[t] with variance σ2L = Nσ
2
l . Note
that this is equivalent to filtering the aggregate white noise
L′[t] =
∑N
i=1 l
′[t] (having variance σ2L′ ), with the filter K. In
case of Gaussian white noise addition, the filter K is absent
and L[t] = L′[t].
The Meters, the Aggregator and the EE execute a crypto-
graphic protocol that makes operations oblivious (e.g. as the
one proposed in [26]), meaning that the Aggregator node can
perform additions on the measurements, but cannot access the
individual inputs nor the generated noise. Depending on the
available technology and computational power at the Meters,
the Aggregator can be implemented either centralized [21] or
distributed [26].
A well designed system should provide a low σ2L, while
ensuring a required level of privacy. Some categories of EEs,
e.g. the billing service, impose strict tolerance thresholds
on σ2L. Other categories of EEs, such as operators on the
wholesale market who need to collect aggregate metering data
for statistical purposes, may tolerate much higher values of σ2L.
IV. ADVERSARY AND PRIVACY MODEL
A. Adversarial Model
We assume that both the Aggregator and the EE behave
according to the honest-but-curious attacker model, i.e., they
correctly execute the protocol, but store all their inputs and
process them in order to obtain additional information about
the individual measurements si[t]. These nodes are expected
to use an optimal algorithm to achieve their goal. Moreover,
we assume that a secure communication channel is available
between the nodes and, thus, the system is protected against
eavesdroppers and other external attackers. In addition, the
EE can collude with one or more meters in order to obtain the
individual measurements of another meter. By collusion, we
mean either that those meters are compromised, or simply that
their behavior is very easy to predict, which is not uncommon
in this scenario.
B. Privacy Model
The Privacy Challenge described below leverages notions
from modern cryptography and differential privacy. We start
by observing that we cannot easily give a mathematical
definition of privacy. However, we can say that an aggregate
measurement that does not include data from user a clearly
respects the privacy of a to the maximum possible extent, since
a is not even present. Now, suppose that the curious attacker is
shown two noiseless aggregates. One includes data from a and
the other one does not. Instead of a, the aggregate contains
data from a user randomly chosen from the same population
of a. All other users in the aggregate behave the same. If the
attacker is able of guessing even a single bit of information
about a, then it can easily tell in which aggregate a is.
Now, suppose that the curious attacker is shown the same
two noiseless aggregates, but each aggregate is added to a
different noise. Even if the attacker has some information
about a, it can be difficult to guess in which aggregate a is,
because of the injection of random noise. Even further, if the
attacker has complete knowledge about a, it may not be able
to guess because of noise. Therefore, we measure the loss
of privacy of a as the ability of an observer to tell apart the
behavior of a from the behavior of another user from the same
population. More formally, we will say that the aggregation
system is privacy-friendly if the probability that the Attacker
makes a correct guess is close to 1/2. A significant deviation
from 1/2 means that the system is not very privacy-friendly.
Definition 1 (Privacy Challenge). The challenger computes
the noisy aggregate time series Xa[t] and Xb[t], within the
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observation window 0 ≤ t ≤ Ns − 1, calculated over N
participants as follows:
Xa[t] =
∑
1≤i≤N
i 6=a,i6=b
si[t] + sa[t] + La[t]
Xb[t] =
∑
1≤i≤N
i 6=a,i6=b
si[t] + sb[t] + Lb[t]
The challenger sends the sequences Xa[t] and Xb[t] in a
random order and the smart metering data sa[t] for 0 ≤ t ≤
Ns−1. The adversary wins the challenge if it guesses whether
the user a participates in the noisy aggregate time series Xa[t]
or Xb[t].
Definition 2 (ε-Privacy). The aggregation architecture pro-
vides ε-Privacy if no decision algorithm can give the correct
answer to the Privacy Challenge with probabilty larger than
1/2 + ε for any pair of users (a, b) in the set.
Note that the two aggregates Xa[t] and Xb[t] differ only
by a single participant: the former contains the measurements
sa[t], whereas in the latter the measurement of user a has been
replaced by the measurement sb[t] of another user b from the
same population. The optimal strategy for the Adversary is
applying a decision algorithm that calculates the correlation
between the time series sa[t] and Xa[t] and between sa[t] and
Xb[t] as follows:
Rsa,Xa =
Ns−1∑
t=0
sa[t]Xa[t] (1)
Rsa,Xb =
Ns−1∑
t=0
sa[t]Xb[t] (2)
The adversary chooses the noisy aggregate time series that
results in the highest correlation.
Clearly, the higher is the noise variance σ2L, the smaller
is the difference between Rsa,Xa and Rsa,Xb , thus making
the probability of correct guess approach 1/2. In other words,
defining:
R = Rsa,Xa −Rsa,Xb
we can say that:
• The adversary makes the right choice when R > 0;
• The adversary makes the wrong choice when R ≤ 0.
Considering the linearity property of the operation of cor-
relation, the decision algorithm assumes that the inequality
Rsa,sa > Rsa,sb always holds. This means that the adversary
TABLE I
MAIN SYMBOLS
Sequence Definition Characterization
sa[t] Measurements of user a Deterministic
sb[t] Measurements of user b Deterministic
Sa[t] Measurements of aggregate a Deterministic
Sb[t] Measurements of aggregate b Deterministic
La[t] Gaussian noise process for aggregate a Stochastic
Lb[t] Gaussian noise process for aggregate b Stochastic
Xa[t] Sa[t] + La[t] Stochastic
Xb[t] Sb[t] + Lb[t] Stochastic
always assumes that the correlation of sa[t] with itself is
greater than the correlation between sa[t] and sb[t].
It is worth noting that sa[−t] can be seen as the im-
pulse response of a LTI filter named correlation filter. Then,
F{sa[−t]} = S∗a(ϕ) is the frequency response of the cor-
relation filter, where F indicates the Discrete-Time Fourier
Transform (DTFT) and 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 1 indicates the normalized
frequency. This expression is analogous to a Matched Filter,
which is optimal in case of white noise injection [27].
It is important to note that the attacker is defined to use
the optimal strategy in presence of Additive White Gaussian
Noise (AWGN), therefore if a system can be proved to be
privacy-friendly under this strategy, then it is resistant to the
all the wide family of deanonymization or load-monitoring
attempts such as the attacks in [28] and [9], to name a few
of the documented ones, and even to any other attack not
yet described belonging to the same family. In fact, if any of
these attacks could extract any information from the aggregate,
then these pieces of information could be used to win the
challenge. As a consequence, if the success of the challenge
can be proved to be close to 1/2, that means that no attack
can extract useful information.
In the following Section we provide a theoretical analysis of
the Privacy Challenge considering two different case studies,
which differ in the characterization of noise injection and
correlation.
V. ANALYTICAL RESULTS
Table I lists the main symbols used in the reminder of
the Section. Note that the two processes Xa[t] and Xb[t] are
Gaussian, since they are obtained by summing deterministic
signal Sa[t] (resp. Sb[t]) to a Gaussian process La[t] (resp.
Lb[t]). Therefore, the quantities Rsa,Xa and Rsa,Xb defined in
Section IV, as well as their difference R, can be statistically
characterized as Gaussian random variables. We derive the
following theorems.
Theorem 1 (White noise). If L[t] is a Gaussian white noise
with zero-mean and variance σ2L, then the aggregation archi-
tecture provides ε-Privacy with
ε =
∣∣∣∣12 erfc
−∑Ns−1t=0 (sa[t]2 − sa[t]sb[t])
2σL
√∑Ns−1
t=0 sa[t]
2
− 1
2
∣∣∣∣ (3)
with a and b chosen from the population so that ε is maximum.
The proof is provided in Appendix A.
5Theorem 2 (Colored noise). Let L[t] be a Gaussian colored
noise with zero-mean and Power Spectral Density PSDL(ϕ) =
σ2L′ |K(ϕ)|2, with
∫ 1
0
|K(ϕ)|2dϕ = 1. Then, the aggregation
architecture provides ε-Privacy with
ε =
∣∣∣∣12 erfc
− ∑Ns−1t=0 (sa[t]2 − sa[t]sb[t])
2σL′
√∫ 1
0
|K(ϕ)|2|Sa(ϕ)|2dϕ
− 1
2
∣∣∣∣ (4)
with a and b chosen from the population so that ε is maximum.
The proof is provided in Appendix B.
The design of the filter K in case of colored noise addition
is an important issue to address, since the energy spectrum
|K(ϕ)|2 influences the value of the denominator in Equation
(4). Specifically, the parameter ε decreases when the denomi-
nator increases, thus providing a better ε-Privacy for the users.
Note that the filter K is normalized, i.e., it has unitary
energy (
∫ 1
0
|K(ϕ)|2dϕ = 1). This way, we guarantee that the
variance of the additive noise is the same both for white and
colored noise, since:
σ2L =
∫ 1
0
PSDL(ϕ)dϕ = σ
2
L′
∫ 1
0
|K(ϕ)|2dϕ = σ2L′
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We consider real home energy consumption traces taken
from the SMART* dataset [14]. The main parameters of the
dataset are summarized in Table II. The dataset consists in
power consumption traces of 400 different homes sampled
every minute for a period of 24 hours.
The privacy preserving framework is agnostic with respect
to the purposes of the metering data collection. Different appli-
cations have different requirements in terms of data accuracy.
The accuracy of the aggregated data is quantified in terms of a
Perturbation Coefficient ψ defined as ψ = σL/(NPave), where
σL is the standard deviation of the perturbation noise, N is
the number of aggregated users, Pave is the per-user average
power consumption. The Perturbation Coefficient is a tunable
parameter that can be set to different values depending on the
specific application: the lower the Perturbation Coefficient, the
higher the accuracy of the data and, on the other hand the
worse the privacy. It is worth noting that several commonly
used metering devices show an error in the order of +/-2% (see,
for example, [29]). Therefore, we expect that an aggregate
error of about ψ = 10−2 is compatible with the tolerance of
most of the commonly deployed smart grid ancillary services
(see [30] for a reference list). However, some applications
may tolerate higher values of ψ. In this case, the size of the
TABLE II
SMART* DATASET [14] DESCRIPTION
Parameter Description Value
Ns Number of samples per trace 1440
Ts Sampling period 1 min
Tobs Duration 24 h
Pave Average power 1.22 kW
Pmin Minimum power 0.089 kW
Pmax Peak power 14.69 kW
Pstd Std. Dev. of power per trace 0.91 kW
102 103 104 105
10−3
10−2
10−1
Number of users, N
Pr
iv
ac
y,
ε
White noise - Analytical
White noise - Simulation
Colored noise - Analytical
Colored noise - Simulation
Fig. 3. Value of the privacy parameter, ε, versus the size of the aggregation
set N both in case of analytical evaluation and simulation results (Ts = 15
min, Tobs = 24 h, ψ = 10−2)
aggregation set required to achieve a target privacy level can
be reduced (see Figures 3 and 4 and related comments).
For the considered traces, where Pave = 1.22 kW (see Table
II), ψ = 10−2 corresponds to a noise with standard deviation
σl = 12.2 W per meter.
A. Comparison with simulation results
We consider a scenario in which the EE knows the aggregate
noisy time series Xa[t], Xb[t] and the corresponding samples
of the time series sa[t]. We have re-sampled the traces with a
sampling period of Ts = 15 min, which is more in line with
the current smart-metering technical specifications, thus each
time series is composed of Ns = Tobs/Ts = 96 samples.
We choose to design the filter K for noise coloring as
similarly as possible to the estimated spectral characterization
of the Smart Meter measurements si[t]. This way, it is possible
to hide the additive noise and to reduce the effectiveness of the
Matched Filter used to exploit the decision algorithm described
in Section IV. Hence, the chosen energy spectrum of K has
the following squared absolute magnitude:
|K(ϕ)|2 = |S˜(ϕ)|
2∫ 1
0
|S˜(ϕ)|2dϕ
(5)
where |S˜(ϕ)|2 is the average spectrum of the consumption
traces of the dataset.
Simulation results are obtained by randomly choosing pairs
of meters, calculating the challenge sets according to Def-
inition 1 (which includes the generation of random noise),
then calculating the correlations using (1) and (2). Finally, the
adversary chooses the aggregate with the largest correlation.
Analytical results are obtained by applying (3) and (4).
Figure 3 shows the resulting Privacy, ε, versus the size
of the aggregate set, N , for both white and colored noise.
Results have been obtained both analytically and by means of
simulations.
Simulation results closely approach the analytical estima-
tions for both white and colored noise. Simulations also
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confirm that, for given values of ψ and N , the usage of colored
noise allows for a consistent improvement of the user privacy
with respect to white noise. Conversely, for a target level of
privacy and a given value of ψ, colored noise allows for a
reduction of the number of users N . For example, if we want
to guarantee that ε < 10−2, in case of white noise addition
the aggregation set must contain more than N = 65000
users, while in case of colored noise the aggregation set size
can be reduced to about N = 8000. It is worth noting that
our proposed aggregation mechanism works for any arbitrary
choice of N , at the price of lowering the achieved privacy
level. Therefore, the remainder of the Section thoroughly
investigates the tradeoff between aggregation set size, data
precision and privacy level.
B. Impact of tunable parameters
Figure 4 shows the privacy parameter, ε, versus the aggrega-
tion set size, for various values of the Perturbation Coefficient,
ψ, for both white and colored perturbation noise.
The graph shows that decreasing the value of ψ (i.e.,
increasing data precision) leads to a worse ε-Privacy, both in
case of white and colored noise. It also shows that the value
of ε guaranteed by white noise and ψ = 10−1 is comparable
to the one provided by colored noise and ψ = 10−3. This
means that colored noise makes it possible to use a lower
noise variance to achieve a target privacy level, thus leading
to a higher precision of the aggregated data, while maintaining
the same size of the aggregation set.
Figure 5 shows how the ε-Privacy of the users is affected
by the length of the observation windows Tobs. In case of
white noise addition, increasing the observation window Tobs
(i.e. expanding the time period during which the EE collects
the aggregated data) leads to a smaller ε-Privacy for the
users, since the adversary obtains more information about the
correlation between the samples of the traces.
Conversely, in case of colored noise, increasing Tobs does
not significantly affect the ε-Privacy. This is because the col-
oring filter K is specifically designed to make the perturbation
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noise match the signal energy spectrum, thus making the noise
more difficult to be removed (see (5)).
Figure 6 shows how the ε-Privacy of the users is affected
by the duration of the measurement sampling period Ts. In
case of white noise addition, decreasing Ts (i.e., providing
the EE with aggregated data of finer granularity) leads to a
lower ε-Privacy for the users, since the adversary can exploit
more information about the correlation of the time series
measurements. Conversely, in case of colored noise, lowering
Ts does not significantly affect the user ε-Privacy.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper defines the concept of ε-Privacy, which makes
it possible to evaluate the privacy guarantees for the users
of a Smart Grid aggregation architecture as a function of the
perturbation noise added to the Smart Meter aggregate mea-
surements. We provide formulas for calculating the achieved
ε-Privacy in case of Gaussian white and colored noise. We
show with simulations that noise addition can achieve arbitrary
levels of ε-Privacy. Further, by suitably coloring noise, it
is possible to achieve the same level of privacy with a
much lower noise variance and, thus, higher data precision.
We also investigate how various system parameters, such as
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the aggregation group size, the observation interval and the
sampling time, impact on the tradeoff between data precision
and user privacy. The results are optimal, meaning that no
attack to privacy can be more effective than what is predicted
by using this framework.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof: We want to compute:
ε = Pr {R > 0} − 1/2 (6)
To do so, we need to calculate mean and variance of the
random variable R = Rsa,Xa − Rsa,Xb (see Figure 7). The
correlation Rsa,Xa can be expressed as:
Rsa,Xa = Rsa,Sa +Rsa,La
The first term can be further rewritten as follows:
Rsa,Sa = Rsa,sa +Rsa,Sa−sa
=
Ns−1∑
t=0
sa[t]
2 +
∑
1≤i≤N
i 6=a,i6=b
Ns−1∑
t=0
sa[t]si[t]
Moreover, Rsa,La is a Gaussian random variable, obtained by
filtering the Gaussian white random process La[t] with the
LTI correlation filter and sampling the output in τ = 0, as
depicted in Figure 7, according to the Matched Filter theory
[27]. Considering that sa[t] is a real-valued time series and
thus |sa[t]|2 = sa[t]2, by exploiting the Parseval’s Theorem,
the probability distribution of Rsa,La is:
Rsa,La ∼ N
(
0, σ2L
Ns−1∑
t=0
sa[t]
2
)
where the notation X ∼ N (µ, σ2) means that the random
variable X is normally distributed with mean µ and variance
σ2. It follows that Rsa,Xa is also a Gaussian random variable
defined as:
Rsa,Xa ∼ N
(Ns−1∑
t=0
sa[t]
2 +
∑
1≤i≤N
i 6=a,i6=b
Ns−1∑
t=0
sa[t]si[t],
σ2L
Ns−1∑
t=0
sa[t]
2
)
The same considerations hold for Rsa,Xb , therefore:
Rsa,Xb ∼ N
(Ns−1∑
t=0
sa[t]sb[t] +
∑
1≤i≤N
i 6=a,i6=b
Ns−1∑
t=0
sa[t]si[t],
σ2L
Ns−1∑
t=0
sa[t]
2
)
Thus, R is a Gaussian random variable with mean µR and
variance σ2R defined as follows:
µR =
Ns−1∑
t=0
sa[t]
2 −
Ns−1∑
t=0
sa[t]sb[t], (7)
σ2R = 2σ
2
L
Ns−1∑
t=0
sa[t]
2 (8)
Therefore, ε can be computed as:
ε = Pr {R > 0} − 1
2
=
1
2
erfc
(
− µR
σR
√
2
)
− 1
2
(9)
By substiting (7) and (8) into (9), we obtain:
ε =
1
2
erfc
−∑Ns−1t=0 (sa[t]2 − sa[t]sb[t])
2σL
√∑Ns−1
t=0 sa[t]
2
− 1
2
Note that ε is positive (negative) iff µR is positive (negative).
If ε > 0, the decision algorithm defined in Section IV
is the best algorithm the adversary could apply, since the
assumption Rsa,sa > Rsa,sb holds. If this assumption does
not hold, i.e. ε ≤ 0, it is possible to define a dual decision
algorithm. Considering such algorithm, the decider makes the
right (wrong) choice when R ≤ 0 (R > 0). Therefore,
by exploiting the dual decisional algorithm, the adversary
increases its probability of correct guess with respect to a coin
toss also when µR < 0. Hence, we can eventually calculate ε
as:
ε =
∣∣∣∣12 erfc
−∑Ns−1t=0 (sa[t]2 − sa[t]sb[t])
2σL
√∑Ns−1
t=0 sa[t]
2
− 1
2
∣∣∣∣
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Fig. 8. Theorem 2: The adversary’s decision algorithm in case of colored
noise addition
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof: By applying the same procedure described in
Appendix A to prove Theorem 1, we obtain:
R ∼ N
(
µR =
Ns−1∑
t=0
sa[t]
2 −
Ns−1∑
t=0
sa[t]sb[t],
σ2R = 2σ
2
L′
∫ 1
0
|K(ϕ)|2|Sa(ϕ)|2dϕ
)
In this case (see Figure 8), we can evaluate PSDRsa,La (ϕ)
and PSDRsa,Lb (ϕ), i.e., the output PSDs of the colored noise
processes La[t] and Lb[t] once filtered by the LTI correlation
filter, in the following way:
PSDRsa,La (ϕ) = PSDRsa,Lb (ϕ) = PSDL(ϕ)|Sa(ϕ)|2
= σ2L′ |K(ϕ)|2|Sa(ϕ)|2
Hence, it follows that:
σ2R = 2
∫ 1
0
PSDRsa,La (ϕ)dϕ = 2σ
2
L′
∫ 1
0
|K(ϕ)|2|Sa(ϕ)|2dϕ
The rest of the proof is analogous to Theorem 1.
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